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Residential Property Tax Reform in Northern Ireland: 
Impact Analysis and Spatial Redistribution
BY WILLIAM J. MCCLUSKEY, PH.D.; PEADAR DAVIS;  
AND LAY CHENG LIM, PH.D.
The treatment of housing for local rates (property tax) has been the 
subject of a continuing debate in the 
United Kingdom (UK) for decades, as it 
has been in many other countries. The 
domestic sector in Northern Ireland has 
recently been subject to rating reform 
and a revaluation to a capital-improved 
basis. Previously, the domestic sector 
was valued on the basis of rental values 
prevalent in the late 1960s for the 1976 
General Revaluation (the last time 
domestic property was revalued). The 
valuation list was therefore out of date, 
and there were significant anomalies in 
the way it distributed the rate burden. As 
a result, inequities had built up over the 
years with the loss of a clear relationship 
between tax bills and current market 
values. 
Northern Ireland recently moved to a 
capital value system, and the remainder 
of the UK is considering a number of 
options for reforming public finance. To 
assess the wider implications of a change 
in the domestic rating for Northern Ire-
land, we conducted a research study to 
determine the likely redistributive effects 
of such a change to inform policy mak-
ers and decision makers on the future 
direction of domestic rating in Northern 
Ireland and elsewhere. A geographic in-
formation system (GIS) also was used to 
show the spatial distribution of tax and 
the effect of a shift from the previous net 
annual value (NAV)-based domestic rates 
to one based on capital values. We found 
that a discrete value system performs well 
in terms of minimising the number of 
losers (taxpayers with higher levies) and 
providing a fairer and more equitable 
local tax and that impact analysis has an 
important role to play in property taxa-
tion policy making.
Background
Through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, 
there has been an intensive and extensive 
investigation into the fairest and most 
equitable manner by which locally based 
rating revenue can be raised (Hills and 
Sutherland, 1991; Layfield Committee 
1976; Midwinter 1989; Ridge and Smith 
1991; Smith and Squire 1987). The whole 
question of domestic property rate re-
form in Northern Ireland has to a large 
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extent been overshadowed by events in 
the rest of the United Kingdom. Neither 
the Community Charge nor the Coun-
cil Tax has been imposed in Northern 
Ireland. The so-called “Troubles” may 
have had a large part to play; however, 
with the devolution of powers to a newly 
formed Northern Ireland Assembly in 
1998, the potential role of rates began to 
take centre stage. (The Northern Ireland 
Assembly was established as part of the 
Belfast Agreement [otherwise known as 
the Good Friday Agreement] on April 10, 
1998. The agreement set out the plan for 
devolved government including the cre-
ation of the Assembly and Executive.) 
The Programme for Government 
2001–04 (Northern Ireland Executive 
2001–2004) indicated the importance 
of ensuring that local revenue is raised 
in ways that are fair, taking into account 
the objectives of targeting social need and 
promoting equality of opportunity. The 
then Minister of Finance and Personnel 
announced the Review of Rating Policy 
in March 2001 to evaluate the current sys-
tem and possible alternatives. The Review 
of Rating Policy: A Consultation Paper was 
published in May 2002 (Northern Ireland 
Executive 2002a). Despite the suspension 
of the devolved administration in October 
2002, the review is seen as a central plat-
form for delivering a fair and equitable 
local rating system. Underpinning the 
review is the fact that the Reinvestment 
and Reform Initiative for Northern Ire-
land allows the Executive to borrow funds 
for infrastructure investment, with the 
loans being serviced by additional local 
revenue, that is, local rates (Northern 
Ireland Executive 2002b). (The Reinvest-
ment and Reform Initiative, announced 
on May 2, 2002, is aimed at addressing 
the long-standing problems in the ma-
jor public services of health, education, 
roads, water, and sewerage.)
The primary aim of Domestic Rating 
Reform is to achieve a balance between 
economic efficiency (those who benefit 
from services, pay) and fairness or equity 
(those who pay, can pay). The reform 
replaces the current rental value system 
with one based on capital values; at the 
same time, all properties are being re-
valued for the first time since 1976. As a 
result, there will be a significant redistri-
bution of the rate burden, although the 
actual impact is likely to be cushioned 
by a transitional relief scheme (which 
is outside the scope of our study). This 
reform provides an unusually informa-
tive opportunity to study the impact of 
these changes on the residential prop-
erty sector.
Undertaking this type of redistributive 
analysis is largely dependent upon hav-
ing access to data of high quality and in 
sufficient quantity. Earlier studies that 
examined redistribution effects were, to 
a large extent, constrained by the avail-
ability and quality of the data. Research 
conducted by Evans (1976) was based on 
data from a 20 percent sample survey of 
sales reported to the Inland Revenue. 
Evans found that, overall, 55 percent 
of dwellings would be entitled to a re-
duction and 45 percent would have an 
increase. Ford and Brown (1978) based 
their results on a sample of 249 sales 
(for the town of Woking). They found 
that properties close to the city centre 
would be beneficiaries, whereas proper-
ties in suburban areas would face rate 
increases. Wyatt (1982) found that an in-
crease in rates would shift from newer to 
older properties, from smaller to larger 
properties, and from cheaper to more 
expensive properties. He utilised a work-
able sample of 620 dwellings for the city 
of Derby. However, only asking prices, 
not actual selling prices, were available. 
Hattersley, Lizieri, and Chandler (1989) 
studied 1,279 properties (for England 
and Wales) drawn from the Department 
of the Environment/Building Societies 
Association’s 5 percent Survey of Build-
ing Society Mortgages for a single month 
(June 1987). They found that 52 percent 
of dwellings would have a reduced rating 
liability and 48 percent would have an 
increase. In addition, they found that 
higher-priced dwellings would carry a 
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higher rate burden under a capital value 
system and that lower-priced properties 
would have their rate burden reduced.
In our study, we analysed the effects 
of the rating changes on a sample of 
46,407 sold properties. Utilising GIS, 
we generated maps that showed the 
distributional impact of a shift in tax 
bills from the current NAV system to the 
alternative of a capital value system. We 
studied the relationship of tax incidence 
to a measure of ability to pay at a ward 
level (the spatial units used to elect local 
government councillors). The measure, 
income deprivation, was compiled by the 
Social Disadvantage Research Centre 
(SDRC 2001) and is one of the accepted 
benchmarks for assessing deprivation 
for Northern Ireland policy makers. 
This measure allowed us to compare the 
redistributive results with levels of depri-
vation in order to determine whether the 
reform is improving or worsening ability 
to pay at the ward level. 
The next section discusses the current 
rating system and the basic policy op-
tions available. The data and methods 
used in analysing these options are then 
outlined, and the redistributive impact 
of the reform is examined. The main 
findings are drawn together in the final 
section. 
The Pre-reform Domestic Rating 
System
The domestic rating system in Northern 
Ireland has remained virtually un-
changed since its statutory inception in 
1852. The basis of rating is an assessment 
of the hypothetical Net Annual Value for 
each rateable property; the rate liability 
is simply calculated by applying a rate 
in the pound to the assessed NAV. Net 
annual value is defined as follows:
…the rent for which, one year with 
another, the hereditament might, in its 
actual state, be reasonably expected to let 
from year to year, the probable average an-
nual cost of repairs, insurance and other 
expenses (if any) necessary to maintain 
the hereditament in its actual state, and 
all rates, taxes or public charges (if any), 
being paid by the tenant. (Schedule 12 
Part 1 of the Rates [Northern Ireland] 
Order 1977)
In the mid-nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the predominant 
tenurial form was based on the rent-
ing of property. As figure 1 illustrates, 
there has been a significant structural 
change in the residential market with a 
marked decline in the rental sector in 
comparison to the growth in levels of 
owner occupation.
Figure 1. Structure of the residential property market in Northern Ireland by tenure type
Source: Northern Ireland Housing Statistics
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The future shape of the domestic rat-
ing system therefore must recognise the 
availability of market evidence. In this 
regard, the continued use of a rental-
value-based approach would be difficult 
to sustain simply on the basis of avail-
ability of sufficient transaction evidence 
(Layfield Committee 1976; McCluskey, 
Plimmer, and Connellan 1998; Wyatt 
1983). The Reform of Rating Policy 
consultation document (Northern Ire-
land Executive 2002b) indicated that to 
retain a local rating system, the primary 
option would be a capital-value-based 
approach. The arguments in support 
of capital value rating are persuasive; 
for example, substantial information is 
available to valuers on open market sell-
ing prices. In addition, there would be 
greater transparency because ratepayers 
would have a better understanding of the 
rationale behind assessed values.
The shift to a capital value solution 
for Northern Ireland has, in essence, 
two aspects: (1) whether to implement a 
property-value-banded system, as used in 
the rest of the UK, or (2) whether to in-
troduce a discrete capital value approach. 
This leads on to an interesting question 
for local governments in the remainder 
of the UK: Should they retain a banded 
system or move to a discrete system, if they 
indeed opt to retain a property tax? The 
recently concluded Lyons Inquiry into 
Local Government (2007) conducted a 
wide-ranging investigation into these mat-
ters. The result was a recommendation 
that the Council Tax be retained in the 
short term and revalued in the medium 
term, with an option of reform to discrete 
values in the long term.
Under a discrete capital value system, 
each individual property is given an as-
sessed capital value. A banded capital 
value system, as used in the rest of the 
UK, categorises property by reference to 
a value band. In essence, a broad estimate 
of a property’s capital value is made, and 
then it is allocated to the appropriate 
band (McCluskey, Plimmer, and Connel-
lan 2002). In contrast to value banding, 
which has extremely limited international 
usage, a discrete value approach has 
widespread application (Bird and Slack 
2004; McCluskey, Lim, and Davis 2004; 
McCluskey, Plimmer, and Connellan 
1999). Furthermore, research carried 
out in each of the three Great Britain 
jurisdictions indicates that the current 
Council Tax system is highly regressive 
(Convention of Scottish Local Authori-
ties 2001; Giles and Ridge 1993; Institute 
of Revenues, Rating and Valuation 1999; 
Kenway and Palmer 1999; Longley, Higgs, 
and Martin 1996; Plimmer 1999; Plimmer, 
McCluskey, and Connellan 1999; Welsh 
Assembly Government 2002). Whilst 
more progressive banding approaches 
could be used, evidence suggests that a 
discrete value approach is likely to pro-
duce optimum property tax performance 
in terms of vertical and horizontal equity 
and ability to pay (Davis, McCluskey, and 
Lim 2004).
Data Sources and Database 
Construction
The property sales data supplied by the 
Valuation and Lands Agency (VLA) 
covered a five-year period from 1998 to 
2002. For quality control, we excluded 
from these data first-time sales from de-
velopers, sales from the public sector to 
tenants under the “right to buy” scheme, 
agricultural dwellings whose selling price 
included agricultural land, and any cases 
which evidenced data entry problems. 
The data were further cleaned by remov-
ing properties with obvious data errors 
and blank fields. The total number of 
usable sales for all 26 district councils 
was 46,407, or approximately 7 percent 
of the total dwelling stock. 
Given that data over a five-year period 
were used, it was necessary to adjust sell-
ing prices to a common valuation date, 
that is, April 1, 1999. Applying this com-
mon valuation date allowed for a more 
objective cross comparison between the 
various district councils. A time-adjusted 
sales price (TASP) was calculated by us-
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ing a regression-based technique that 
calculates the monthly growth rate im-
plied by the data. An implied monthly 
growth rate index was calculated for each 
district council. These indexes were then 
used to adjust each sale price to reflect 
its assumed value at the common date. 
Whilst the market for each property type 
or each area within a district council 
may not have performed equally over 
the period, this methodology gives the 
most accurate estimate of house prices 
on a common date. The approach is well 
documented (Gloudemans 1999) and 
is accepted for adjusting sales price and 
value through time. 
The selling price for each dwelling 
has been used as a proxy for the assessed 
value under a capital value rating system 
(Hattersley, Lizieri, Chandler 1989). 
There may be cases in which the sell-
ing price may not be an accurate and 
objective proxy for assessed value, for 
example, a special purchaser or sales to 
connected parties. However, in the ma-
jority of cases, it is reasonable to assume 
that normal market forces and buyer and 
seller behaviour occurred and thus de-
termined the open-market selling prices. 
The research aggregates the data to the 
ward level, which gives a fairly robust 
picture of average capital values. 
From the TASPs calculated for each 
property, we calculated the new tax bills 
under the capital value system. The 
calculation assumed a revenue-neutral 
position based on the current revenue 
raised by the sample. These tax bills 
were then compared with the tax bills 
generated under the old system to 
analyse the likely redistributive effects 
of the change in the basis of domestic 
rating. The results of the individual-level 
analysis were aggregated to the ward 
level to allow meaningful analysis of the 
effects. Whilst ward-level analysis can 
give only a broad indication of effects, it 
nonetheless illustrates broad trends and 
identifies notable “hot spots” of change, 
which would present policy makers with 
particular challenges.
Results and Discussion
Hot-spot Analysis—Redistributive 
Effect at District Council Level
Any changes in a system of taxation are 
likely to have an impact upon those upon 
whom the tax is levied. A change in the 
way liability is assessed is likely to have an 
uneven effect: the creation of “winners,” 
taxpayers whose levies are less under the 
new system, and ”losers,” taxpayers whose 
levies are more. In terms of tax proposals, 
this result requires analysis of the ability 
to pay. Internationally, property value is 
taken to be an acceptable proxy for the 
ability to pay a property tax, but this is 
by no means universally accepted and is 
certainly not enshrined as such in the UK 
context. Nonetheless, there is generally a 
positive relationship between an individu-
al’s ability to own and/or occupy property 
and his or her wealth. Thus there is at 
least a loose relationship between the 
value of property and the ability to pay a 
tax levied upon that value. In these terms, 
ability to pay is linked to the concept of a 
proportional, or progressive, tax system. 
Thus, a proportional, or progressive, tax 
system also achieves a positive outcome in 
terms of ability to pay under that system, 
at least to some extent. To determine the 
relative merit of rating reform in terms 
of ability to pay, we analysed the data 
delineated by ward in terms of the ward 
average income deprivation measure 
(SDRC 2001) and aggregated for analysis 
and display purposes. 
Each district council was considered 
separately in terms of the actual redis-
tributive effect. Table 1 shows the overall 
results at the district council level in 
terms of winners (those with lower li-
abilities, a ratio of less than 1.0) and 
losers (those with higher liabilities, a 
ratio greater than 1.0). In overall terms, 
a change to discrete capital value rating 
would result in approximately 61 percent 
of all ratepayers (within the sample) be-
ing entitled to reduced rate liability. This 
percentage would vary by district coun-
cil, the largest percentage of winners 
being in Armagh (70 percent), Ards (67 
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percent), and North Down (66 percent), 
and the largest percentage of losers 
being in Newtownabbey (46 percent), 
Moyle (45 percent), Larne (45 percent), 
and Ballymoney (44 percent). 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 provide a Northern 
Ireland overview of the main hot spots 
in terms of rate liability shifts. For ex-
ample, in the Armagh district council, 
70 percent of all property owners would 
receive reductions, whereas in Larne 55 
percent would receive reductions and in 
Belfast, 61 percent.
Hot-spot Analysis—Redistributive 
Effect for Belfast Urban Area
Having looked at the redistributive ef-
fects of changing to a capital value system 
on a Northern Ireland-wide scale, we 
drilled down to examine more closely 
the effects within the Belfast City area, 
the capital of Northern Ireland. This 
analysis is useful because Belfast has 
both large concentrations of high-value 
properties and areas of high deprivation. 
Of the 51 Belfast wards, 35 would on aver-
age experience a fall in rate liability and 
16 would experience an increase. Those 
wards with the largest increases would be 
Ballynafeigh, Botanic, Malone, Stranmil-
lis, and Windsor (all amongst the most 
prosperous wards in Northern Ireland). 
As figure 5 shows, the following wards 
would experience the largest reductions: 
Ardoyne, Ballysillan, Crumlin, Duncairn, 
Glencairn, Highfield, Legoniel, and 
Shankill (all amongst the most deprived 
wards in Northern Ireland). 
Figure 6 depicts, on a ward basis, the 
level of income deprivation compared 
Table 1. Redistributive effect of capital value system at the district council level
District Council
Ratio of Liability
Winners (Less than 1.0) Losers (Greater than 1.0)
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Antrium 787 61 496 39
Ards 1,660 67 838 33
Armagh 616 70 267 30
Ballymena 987 57 736 43
Ballymoney 316 56 250 44
Banbridge 760 64 436 36
Belfast 4,578 61 2,988 39
Carrickfergus 935 60 624 40
Castlereagh 1,541 60 1,028 40
Coleraine 1,378 62 851 38
Cookstown 323 62 204 38
Craigavon 1,376 59 947 41
Derry 875 57 662 43
Down 1,075 62 659 38
Dungannon 495 62 301 38
Fermanagh 651 63 381 37
Larne 654 55 548 45
Limavady 490 58 357 42
Lisburn 2,647 63 1,552 37
Magherafelt 407 62 255 38
Moyle 202 55 169 45
Newry 810 57 602 43
Newtownabbey 1,591 54 1,363 46
North Down 2,368 66 1,226 34
Omagh 363 61 231 39
Strabane 319 58 232 42
Total 28,204 61 18,203 39
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Figure 2. Overall rate liability change at the ward level in Northern Ireland due to capital 
value system 
Figure 3. Rate liability increases of greater than 30 percent due to capital value system 
by ward in Northern Ireland
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Figure 4. Rate liability decreases of more than 20 percent due to capital value system by 
ward in Northern Ireland
Figure 5. Rate liability decreases of more than 20 percent in Belfast urban area due to 
capital value system
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with the percentage rate change. The 
largest gainers would be households in 
the more deprived areas, whilst house-
holds in the less deprived areas would 
either gain less or indeed lose. In addi-
tion, higher-priced dwellings would carry 
a higher rate burden, whilst lower-priced 
properties would have their rate burden 
reduced. Analysis on a Northern Ireland-
wide basis showed that this pattern was 
generally consistent, with some notable 
exceptions where the makeup of a ward 
included disparate elements of very high 
property values alongside, yet geographi-
cally separate from, pockets of extreme 
deprivation. Note that this analysis mea-
sured change from the previous rating 
system, which already reflected these 
factors to a greater or lesser extent. 
Conclusions
The analysis reported in this paper used 
GIS to identify the spatial redistribu-
tion of property tax bills following a 
revaluation and change in the tax base. 
A long period had elapsed since the last 
revaluation, allowing considerable shifts 
in relative property values between dif-
ferent geographic areas. It is essential 
to be able to identify and measure the 
localized effects of policy changes un-
der such circumstances. Successful tax 
reform depends upon public acquies-
cence, which can be jeopardized if the 
extreme effects of policy are not identi-
fied early and planned for appropriately. 
The spatial dimension of tax incidence 
is fundamentally important in answering 
such questions as: Where will the difficul-
ties arise? Where is this policy weak? And 
perhaps, where is it strong?
A number of important findings from 
our study illustrate the likely redistribu-
tive effects of a move to a capital value 
rating system. Firstly, introducing a sys-
tem of discrete capital values will result in 
a greater number of winners—taxpayers 
with reduced rate bills. Secondly, whilst 
lower-valued dwellings will tend to have 
reduced liabilities, the most expensive 
properties will experience an increase. 
Thirdly, from a spatial perspective, a 
Figure 6. Percentage tax change in Belfast wards due to capital value system by income 
deprivation measures (IDM)
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general pattern of redistribution was 
identified in which several inner-city 
wards and a number of suburban wards 
will experience increased rate liabilities. 
Detailed investigation at the property 
level indicated that a considerable reas-
signment of property values will take 
place and result in major changes in tax 
bills for individual properties, generally 
following the pattern just described. 
In terms of an appropriate system 
for Northern Ireland, whilst the dis-
crete capital value system that has been 
introduced does not provide a total 
local taxation solution, it does provide 
a feasible alternative to the previous 
system and a better performance than 
a banded alternative in terms of ability 
to pay. Examination of the mapping of 
the change to a discrete system indicated 
that although most wards will witness 
limited change, there are localised hot 
spots of large increases and decreases in 
rate burden, particularly in the Belfast 
urban area. Liability increases raise the 
issue of affordability; while for liability 
decreases, the issue is local revenue-
raising potential. There may be wider 
implications for the funding of local 
and regional government in Northern 
Ireland—implications that will need 
to be addressed alongside the ongoing 
Review of Public Administration pro-
gramme. Other issues are those linked 
to any system of taxation based upon 
capital values, particularly the “asset rich, 
income poor” issue. All these issues are 
likely to afflict any capital value system, 
but are perhaps more pronounced in a 
discrete approach. 
The technological and data issues 
facing this and other UK jurisdictions 
in introducing a discrete, capital value 
property tax system are surmountable, 
by using a combination of proven tech-
niques and innovative approaches, and 
provide opportunities for cost-effective 
periodic revaluation. For the remain-
ing issues, the answer would appear to 
be a well-balanced basket of reliefs and 
deferments. Nevertheless, the discrete 
capital value approach appears to be both 
methodologically simpler and fairer than 
the banded approach, as well as more 
appropriate and feasible than the rental 
value approach. Given a similar degree of 
administrative feasibility, we suggest the 
discrete approach that has been adopted 
is the approach best suited to the needs 
of the Northern Ireland jurisdiction for 
the foreseeable future. We would be 
overstating our findings if we suggested 
the introduction of a discrete capital 
value system into the rest of the United 
Kingdom, particularly given the highly 
political nature of property taxation and 
the necessity of public support for re-
form. Rather, the likelihood is that such 
an introduction would produce a similar 
profile of outcomes, that is, redistribution 
of the tax burden under a proportional 
system, creating a far less regressive tax 
and redistributing tax burden toward 
more valuable properties in particular 
and more affluent areas in general.
We have shown that the impacts of the 
tax reform changes are fairly propor-
tional, although some deprived areas will 
gain less than the average. Nevertheless, 
in the switch to a capital value system, al-
though many higher-value properties will 
no doubt simply see themselves as losing, 
three-fifths of the households in Northern 
Ireland will be winners. Our research and 
findings have strategic importance from 
a number of perspectives, not the least 
of which is the contribution to inform-
ing the policy debate surrounding the 
reform of the domestic rating system for 
Northern Ireland and other jurisdictions. 
More directly, our findings demonstrate 
the need for jurisdictions considering 
reform to carry out impact analyses to in-
form, guide, and defend policy decisions. 
Clearly, other areas of research require 
more detailed investigation, such as the 
effect of the new system on low-income 
households, on areas of high depriva-
tion, and, ultimately, on the ability to 
pay. These areas are part of our ongoing 
research, and we hope they will further 
inform the decision-making process.
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